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Abstract 
 
 
In this response paper I defend an alternative position to both Jennifer McMahon’s neo-Kantian view on the 
aesthetics of perceptual experience, and the sense-data theory that she rightly repudiates. McMahon argues 
that sense perception is informed by concepts “all the way out,” and that the empiricist notion of unmediated 
sensuous access to entities in the world is untenable. She further claims that art is demanding inasmuch as it 
compels one to engage in an open-ended, cognitive interpretive process with sensuous phenomena, and that it 
is this very process that opens up a space for critique of the entrenched representational concepts by which we 
navigate the world. In contrast, I argue that the sensuous itself is a source of demand. Perceptual objects, in 
virtue of their material constitution, are inexhaustible plexuses of meaning that demand a kind of sensuous, 
interpretive response on the part of our bodily posture and orientation. Works of art offer opportunities for 
critique insofar as they reveal dimensions of sensuous reality hitherto covered over by status quo conceptual 
distributions. McMahon is right that sensuous objects are never simply given. But, I claim, she is wrong to 
suggest that it is only by way of conceptual mediation that we make contact with the world. On the contrary, 
the sensuous self-presentation of things is always at the same time a demand on our sensory apparatus that 
resists encapsulation by concepts.  
 
 
 
Jennifer McMahon offers a clear and compelling argument for a cognitive approach to 
critical artistic efficacy in particular and to perceptual experience more generally. Artworks, 
by means of pervasive conceptual schemes and the implication of spectators’ past 
experiences, invoke indefinite reflection in ways of which neither ordinary discursive 
language nor the sensuous givenness of everyday objects are capable. She claims, in short, 
that artworks are demanding; inasmuch as they offer up no fully determinate meaning but at 
the same time betray a particular attitude or intention on the part of the artist, works of art  
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demand the deployment of a more or less robust conceptual apparatus on the part of the 
spectator in order to render them unified and intelligible. Ordinary perceptual objects are 
similarly demanding, but lack the meta-level intentionality afforded in the artist’s own 
cognitive orientation. The aesthetic, then, whether of works of art or of everyday sense 
perception, “involves concepts all the way out.” This view, as McMahon points out, makes 
it difficult to ascribe to art a viable critical function because dominant, “reified” conceptual 
frameworks are precisely what effective works of art are supposed to expose to critique. She 
attempts to resolve this tension by drawing on Adorno and Habermas in a way that 
privileges “aesthetic form” as the conceptually communicable though non-discursive source 
of intelligibility in art without which the very notion of “critique” would be incoherent. 
 
“Aesthetic form,” it is true, plays an indispensible role in critical theory aesthetics, not only 
for Adorno and Habermas, but also for other figures of the Frankfurt School, Marcuse most 
notably.1 However, it must be observed that what these thinkers have in mind with respect 
to “aesthetic form” is by no means straightforward and unequivocal, and cannot be easily 
consolidated into the well-known subjectivist picture of Kant’s theory of aesthetic 
judgment. Adequate aesthetic judgment, for Kant, purges from its regard all personal or 
private limitations, idiosyncratic preferences, and concerns with sensation; in short, 
adequate aesthetic judgment avoids in its deployment any and all materiality. One must 
abstract away these extraneous elements in order to arrive at a pure a priori judgment of 
form. With such a desiccated object left for aesthetic appraisal, it is hard to imagine anyone 
coming to disagreement over taste. But, those who fail at this process of abstraction are 
precisely those who must be banished from the sensus communis — not because their 
judgments fail to abide in a space of principles, but because they fail to be aesthetic at all. 
Now, if we trace the origin of the aesthetic back to its grounding in aisthesis, sense 
perception, this excommunication turns out to lay bare some rather sinister political 
implications.   
 
For this reason both Adorno and Marcuse reject Kant’s notion of “pure” form in favor of a 
dialectical one that includes materiality and particularity in its capacity for critical 
transformation. Aesthetic form, on this account, distinguishes itself from the reified 
categories of our day-to-day practical negotiations in virtue of its peculiar manner of self-
presentation. Form is neither the conceptual illumination of intention (or appearance of 
intention), nor an abstract, universal shapeliness accessible only to (non-discursive) reason. 
Instead, form is the dialectical mode of presentation in which the “content” of one’s 
ordinary experience is rendered strange and uncanny, and shown to be contingent. Such 
transformative presentation is possible only on the basis of a transcendent materiality from 
whose precognitive unfolding one must draw cues for adequate interpretation and response. 
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In what follows I will challenge McMahon’s thesis by proposing a middle ground between 
what I take to be an unduly subjectivist cognitivism on the one hand, and the empiricist 
picture of discrete, raw sensuous givens on the other, which she rightly repudiates. 
 
Art, in virtue of its formal being as other than what is, discloses what is by disrupting the 
hegemony of the actual. In other words, works of art reveal the contingent nature of what 
things are and how they’re distributed, whether understood in terms of conceptual ordering 
or sensuous structuring, by way of a distinctive logic or manner of internal coherence. We 
need not, however, conclude from this that every perceptual experience of art is cognitively 
mediated, just as we need not posit the nature of perception in general as thoroughly 
mediated by concepts in order to escape certain empiricist pitfalls. As early as Aristotle (De 
Anima 426b), for example, we get the idea that aisthesis itself is a peculiar sort of logos that 
must be grasped on its own terms. That is, sense and sensible are really one to the extent 
that the latter directs the former if a concrete ratio (experience) is to be sustained. 
Proceeding in a Kantian trajectory, by contrast, McMahon uses pejorative language to 
describe the way in which human beings are sometimes presented as abiding in “raw” 
sensuous levels (e.g., “wallowing”). The demands made by art and everyday objects alike 
are always aimed at our conceptual faculties as a priori conditions for the possibility of 
meaning as such. McMahon is right to say, “the meaning of a particular artwork is not 
simply read off like a set of explicit instructions” (i.e., that meaning is not given), but can 
we not instead take this as evidence that the sensuous as such is never simple? The sensuous 
is, ipso facto, demanding, not of a priori conceptual categories, but of rich, precognitive, 
praxical responses, which always take their directives from sensible objects revealed in 
varying modes of self-presentation.   
 
Walking through my house, I notice a small, waxy, spherical object that initially has the 
appearance of a chocolate malt ball. I can’t recall the last time I’ve had chocolate malt balls, 
so the object calls for closer inspection. It turns out to be a red grape that must have rolled 
onto the floor while I was entertaining a couple nights before. How can I account for my 
perceptual error? I did not have a conceptually constituted mental representation of a 
chocolate malt ball that turned out to not coincide with its object out in the world. Rather, 
the grape is in such a way that its being includes the capacity to present itself as something 
resembling a chocolate malt ball at a certain distance from an observer, under certain 
lighting conditions, etc. There does not take place an inscrutable cognitive process in which 
I replace one set of concepts with a more adequate one. Instead, the grape demands that I 
adjust my bodily posture in order to greet it at a perceptual level more appropriate to its 
basic ontological structure. When I do so, the grape more clearly presents itself as what it is, 
though not perfectly. There are still dimensions of its reality that exceed both my sensuous 
awareness and whatever conceptual identity I happen to ascribe to it.   
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Perceptual objects are neither sensuously given, nor conceptually constituted. It is 
unfathomable that I have a “concept” of, say, an avocado. That I know what an avocado is 
upon seeing one is no evidence to the contrary. This merely shows that every sensuous 
encounter with a thing builds upon a sedimented history of such encounters in which, at 
various moments, one has been called to respond with a total bodily orientation to demands 
arising out of a thing’s self-presentation. Any concept I might deploy in an effort to 
sufficiently capture the avocado is shown to be hopelessly poor in the face of its deep 
synaesthetic complexity: the distinctive rough texture — unabstractable in experience from 
its deep green hue — of its outer casing gives way to a smooth, creamy, almost luminous 
light green flesh that exposes to one’s palate a virtual infinity of nuances inexhaustible by 
our conceptual vocabulary. Every object is an inexhaustible plexus of meaning whose 
infinitely diverse modes of self-presentation order perceptual responses in accordance with 
a rich internal normative structure that is never simply given.   
 
The view I am advancing is quite compatible with McMahon’s very convincing claim about 
the ability of poetry (and, presumably, art in general) to frustrate the means-ends dynamics 
of everyday perceptual life. Most of the time, I relate to avocados much more prosaically 
than my above-description would suggest. In my day-to-day dealings, an avocado typically 
presents itself as a means to my end of savoring some wonderful avocado deliciousness. An 
effective still life painting of an avocado (imagine one done by Cezanne) can frustrate this 
largely obfuscating dynamic by disclosing dimensions of the fruit that withdraw from 
whatever instrumental purpose I otherwise set out for it. That is, art is capable of 
circumventing “the default position of our orientation” to things by revealing an 
inexhaustible reserve of sensuous meaning hidden beneath the surface of everyday practical 
life. An artist achieves this remarkable feat, it is true, by working the materials of her craft 
in accordance with a particular attitude or orientation. This is only possible, however, 
because she has already been ordered in a particular direction by the sensuous demands of 
the materials themselves. 
 
The point I am defending can be made more concrete by reference to McMahon’s own 
treatment of Daniel von Sturmer’s experimental art. She points out that von Sturmer’s 
aesthetic experimentation with causal relationships “reveals objective facts to depend upon 
human interests and intention.” It strikes me that precisely the opposite is the case: such 
experiments reveal an excessive range of material possibility that resists subsumption to 
intentional means-end rationality. This non-conceptual product of artistic experimentation is 
also, I would argue, the principal source of art’s critical edge. Artworks show the 
incalculable range of subtle sensuous commands that always resist instrumental reason and 
conceptual encapsulation. Sensuous presentation is not immediately given, however, and we 
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never immediately “wallow” in it. Art can demonstrate for us the complexity of sensuous 
directives usually obscured by daily concerns and politically guided hierarchical 
distributions (e.g., this deserves more attention than that). 
 
Let me say more about art’s powers of critique under the view I’m defending. McMahon 
articulates a serious tension endemic to her Neo-Kantian approach: If wild, sensuous nature 
is presumed to be the source of creativity from which new aesthetic forms are possible, and, 
if McMahon is correct, such a sensuous nature free from conceptual mediation remains an 
impossibility, where does this leave us with respect to creative originality? What is more, 
McMahon’s deployment of the “principle of aesthetic form” suggests that we are 
incorrigibly predisposed to read narrative order in the objects we experience, and that the 
range of such possible narrative configurations is always constrained by previous aesthetic 
norms and conceptual categories. The Kantian “genius” may self-prescribe his own rules of 
form, but if those rules are to be intelligible at all (and acceptable to communities of taste), 
they had better manage to rein in the wanton otherness of originative sources in ways that, 
happily or not, result in maintaining the status quo. This problem is fruitfully transformed 
(not resolved), however, if we replace diegesis with mimesis as the operative mechanism in 
our account of aesthetic processes. If we think of the sensuous not as having order through 
conceptual mediation, but as ordering us by way of preconceptual, presentative (rather than 
representational) cues, then even the most revolutionary innovations in the world of art must 
be understood as in some sense imitative, that is, as coming about through a long, complex 
series of embodied responses to the material universe — simultaneously elusive and 
demanding — and its limitless possibilities. 
 
I say the tension (between originality and obeisance or imitation) is not finally resolved 
because it becomes dialectical. “Copy” extends the being of “original” and discloses 
dimensions of the latter previously unseen. This is the true, non-dualistic nature of mimesis. 
Jacques Rancière, to my mind, brings out the aesthetico-political implications of this claim 
in his recent work on the “redistribution of the sensible.”2 For Rancière, artworks have 
become more and more concerned with and expressive of the conceptually unmediated 
mundane in virtue of a deep, though politically problematized affinity between them. The 
routines and objects that make up everyday life are organized according to politically driven 
distributions of sensible phenomena, distributions that ensure the status quo in ways of 
seeing and acting. He defines the “distribution of the sensible” as: 
 
the system of a priori forms determining what presents itself to sense experience. It 
is a delimitation of spaces and times, of the visible and the invisible, of speech and 
noise, that simultaneously determines the place and stakes of politics as a form of 
experience.3 
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The primary upshot of this a priori distribution is a hierarchy of aesthetic values that has 
little to do with the sensuous self-presentation of experienced objects. A classic example of 
this political hierarchization is John Stuart Mill’s uneasy integration of “quality” into 
Jeremy Bentham’s woefully dicey “hedonic calculus.” One’s feeling of pleasure when 
experiencing an opera, for instance, is intrinsically qualitatively superior to that derived 
from, say, listening to a train pass in the night. This sort of qualitative superiority is, Mill 
claims, “an unquestionable fact” determinable by those “equally acquainted with … both,” 
who “do give a most marked preference to the manner of existence which employs their 
higher faculties.” 4  Environmental sensibilia, then, are parceled out and axiologically 
constrained by politico-cultural norms imposed from the outside by “experts.” 
 
The goal of both grassroots politics and the “aesthetic regime of art” are, for Rancière, the 
same: to disrupt the status quo, thereby opening up a space for the generation of new objects 
and new ways of relating to objects. In short, the common aim is a “re-distribution of the 
sensible,” whereby something as banal as the sound of a train’s nocturnal thrust, or the 
appearance of a rusty bottle cap disappearing into a patch of green grass, is allowed to 
become sensuously significant. The redistribution of the sensible opens up the possibility 
for a de-hierarchized diffusion of the human sensorium into the very heart of everyday 
phenomena. Works of art are paradigmatic of the profoundly diverse ways in which 
redistribution is possible. They are simultaneously examples of sensuous redistribution, and 
pedagogical implements for the divulgence of new, emancipatory ways of engaging the 
mundane sensuous world around us.  
 
                                                         1 Cf. Herbert Marcuse (1978). The Aesthetic Dimension. Boston: Beacon Press.  2 Jacques Rancière (2009). Aesthetics and Its Discontents. Cambridge, UK: Polity. 3 Ibid. p. 13. 4 John Stuart Mill (2003). Utilitarianism. Indianapolis: Hackett, p. 101. 
